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COMMENTS
FROM THE LEGISLATURE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS:
NEW YORK'S CONVERSION DIVORCE UNDER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW SECTION 170
I. INTRODUCTION
To make divorce as difficult as possible and therefore preserve the family
unit, the first general divorce law in New York' provided that adultery was
to be the sole ground for divorce in the state.2 From 1787 until 1879, re-
marriage by the defendant in a divorce action was prohibited.3 The 1879
amendment permitted remarriage after five years of good behavior, upon re-
ceipt of the court's permission; 4 however, adultery remained the sole statutory
ground for divorce. 5
1. Law of March 30, 1787, ch. 69, [1787] N.Y. Laws 494. See Comment, Increased
Grounds for Divorce in New York State: A Proposal, 30 Albany L. Rev. 69, 70 (1966).
When the United States achieved its independence from England, it adopted much of the
English common law. However, in England the ecclesiastical courts exercised jurisdiction
over divorce actions, and there were no such courts in the United States. Consequently,
no established mechanism for obtaining a divorce was adopted, and the only method of
dissolving a marriage was through a special act of the state legislature. 1 H. Foster & D.
Freed, Divorce, Separation and Annulment § 6:4 (1966). When this method proved unsat-
isfactory, it was abandoned by the states and jurisdiction was relinquished to the courts.
In New York, this step was taken in 1787. Mace, Marriage Breakdown or Matrimonial
Offense: A Clinical or Legal Approach to Divorce?, 14 Am. U.L. Rev. 178, 180-81 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Mace]; Wadlington, Divorce W, ithout Fault Without Perjury, 52 Va.
L. Rev. 32, 35-36 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wadlington].
2. Nevertheless, the legislature retained the power to grant divorce on additional grounds
until a 1903 constitutional amendment. See 1 H. Foster & D. Freed, supra note 1, § 6:2
n.16. In addition to allowing the chancellor to dissolve marriages on the ground of adultery
and providing that any remarriage by the adulterous party would be void, the act permit-
ted the other party to remarry "as if the party convicted was actually dead." Law of
March 30, 1787, ch. 69, [1787] N.Y. Laws 494, 495.
3. Law of May 19, 1879, ch. 321, [1879] N.Y. Laws 405. See Legislative Note, Retro-
active Application of New Grounds for Divorce under § 170 Domestic Relations Law, 17
Buffalo L. Rev. 902, 904 (1968).
4. Law of May 19, 1879, ch. 321, [1879] N.Y. Laws 405; Law of April 16, 1879, ch.
164, [1879] N.Y. Laws 231. No adjudicated adulterer was allowed to remarry during the
life of the complainant unless the court which granted the divorce modified the judgment.
Modification was allowed upon a showing that the plaintiff in the prior action had remar-
ried and upon proof of the uniformly good conduct of the defendant, provided a minimum
of five years had passed since entry of the judgment of divorce.
5. "Sociologists, psychiatrists and other behavioral science experts have long maintained
that adultery is not a substantial root cause of marital failure." Perles, Marital Offense
Grounds And Defenses Under 1966 Divorce Reform Act (pts. 1-2), 163 N.Y.L.J., Jan.
12-13, 1970, pt. 2, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Perles]. With reference to the new
law, the same author states: "It is rather refreshing . . . that perjured testimony of
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With the passage of time, this limitation was recognized as unnecessarily
restrictive,0 basically unrealistic, and in need of reevaluation. 7 Perjury, migra-
tory divorces,8 consensual divorces and fraudulently obtained annulments were
among the evils attributed to its outdated provisions.9 As a counterweight,
the New York courts demonstrated a reluctance to permit collateral attacks
on migratory divorces'0 and liberally enforced rules governing annulment and
separation." Nevertheless, a viable divorce law could issue only from the leg-
islature. In spite of public outcry for reform, this obviously outdated situation 2
remained basically unchanged until April 27, 1966 when the Divorce Reform
Law's was signed, with the provision that it was to become effective on Sep-
tember 1, 1967.14 In contrast to prior law, it provided six grounds for divorce:
adultery seems to be no longer necessary." Id. pt. 1, at 4, col. 1. See generally Bureau
Project, A Divorce Reform Act, 5 Harv. J. Legis. 563, 563-73 (1968).
6. "New York's divorce law was the strictest in the United States, in the sense that
all other states had more than one ground for divorce." Comment, New York's New
Divorce Law: Beyond the Sixth Commandment, 5 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1 n.3 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Beyond the Sixth Commandment].
7. See Grossman, How Can We Make Divorce Realistic, 23 N.Y. State Bar Bull. 350
(1951). Although divorce laws vary considerably, it has been noted that adultery Is a
ground for divorce in every American jurisdiction and "is an established and culturally
accepted ground for terminating marriage." Foster, Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of
Man," 37 Fordham L. Rev. 51, 76 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Foster].
8. As of 1965, the number of migratory divorces obtained by New York domicillarles,
in Mexico alone, was in excess of 200,000. Beyond the Sixth Commandment at 2 n.13.
As one author noted: "A woman may appear in a divorce court in Nevada and assure the
judge that she has come to the state with the intention of settling there . . . when in
fact she has no such intention, and actually has a return ticket in her pocket. Again, In
New York State, a man arranges to be found in bed in a hotel room with a woman he
has never seen before, and in whom he has not the slightest sexual interest, in order that
his wife may tell the divorce court judge that her husband has committed adultery."
Mace at 179.
9. 1 H. Foster & D. Freed, supra note 1, § 6:2, at 248-49; Mace at 178-79; Ploscowe, A
Modem Divorce and Judicial Separation Act for New York, 30 Albany L. Rev. 1 (1966).
10. See Phillips, Equitable Preclusion of Jurisdictional Attacks on Void Divorces, 37
Fordham L. Rev. 355 (1969); Comment, supra note 1, at 70-72.
11. See Legislative Note, supra note 3, at 904. One estimate placed the number of New
York annulments at one-third to one-half of all those granted in the United States. Wad-
lington at 33 n.1.
12. "iT]he strength of sin is the law." I Corinthians 15:56, quoted in Wadllngton at
32. A primary purpose of the new law was to eliminate the old evils and abuses. For ex-
ample, although only five percent of all American divorces were migratory, the comparable
figure for New York was estimated at sixty percent. Further, the interpretation of fraud
under the annulment law was far more liberal in New York than in any other state. Note,
New York Domestic Relations Law Amendments, 12 N.Y.L.F. 105 (1966). The 1960
marriage-divorce ratio reflected this tendency. Nationally it was 4:1, while In New York
it was 17:1. Beyond the Sixth Commandment at 2 n.6.
13. Law of April 27, 1966, ch. 254, (1966] N.Y. Laws 833, as amended, N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 170 (Supp. 1969).
14. Id. § 15.
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(1) cruel and inhuman treatment; (2) abandonment for two years; (3) im-
prisonment for three or more consecutive years after the marriage; (4)
adultery; (5) living apart for a minimum of two years pursuant to a separation
decree; and (6) living apart for a minimum of two years pursuant to a written
separation agreement subscribed and acknowledged by the parties. 5 The latter
two grounds are generally referred to as non-fault 10 or conversion grounds.1 7
II. LEGIsLATrV BACKGROUND
While the basic purpose of the Divorce Reform Law was liberalization, the
statute as enacted was the result of numerous compromises.1 8 Due to various
conflicting pressures-religious, political and social-it might have been antic-
ipated that the measure, "spawned in political pragmatism and compromise,
might be afflicted with certain ambiguities .... ."19 While it was obviously a
poorly drafted statute, its deficiencies were disregarded in the effort to achieve
some degree of reform.20
As originally proposed by the Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial
and Family Affairs, the bill would have permitted divorce after consensual liv-
ing apart for two years.2 ' When this proposal, known as the Wilson-Sutton
bill, proved incapable of gaining the necessary support, the legislative leaders
of the Senate and Assembly introduced a compromise measure which came to
be known as the leaders' bill, which would have allowed divorce conversion
only after living apart pursuant to a separation decree for a minimum of five
years.s Adverse legislative reaction led to further compromise and revision,
with the final statute incorporating the two year minimum of the Wilson-Sut-
ton bill, while adding a separation agreement ground to the leaders' bill.
24
15. Id. § 2. The grounds are contained in N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170 (Supp. 1969),
to which the textual numbering conforms.
16. Wadlington at 63-74. But see notes 67-87 infra and accompanying text.
17. "Conversion" is used to indicate that the only requirement for divorce based on
these grounds is that the parties have lived apart for the required period of time in ac-
cordance with the decree or agreement.
18. See Cohen, The Need For Liberal Judicial Construction to Effectuate the Purposes
of the New Divorce Law in New York, 18 Brooklyn Barrister 13 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Cohen].
19. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 59 Mlsc. 2d 412, 413-14, 298 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (Sup. CL 1969).
In fact, "it was an unexpected miracle that nonfault grounds for divorce survived in
even limited form." Foster & Freed, The Conversion Ground for Divorce in New York
(pts. 1-3), 161 N.Y.L.J. Apr. 30-fay 2, 1969, pt. 1, at 1, col. S [hereinafter cited as
Foster & Freed].
20. See Cohen at 13; Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 1, col. 4.
21. Senate Intro. No. 627, 1966 N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 60; Foster & Freed pt. 1,
at 1, col 4. There was no requirement that the living apart be pursuant to either a Sep-
aration decree or agreement.
22. Senate Intro. No. 4504, 1966 N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 423; Assembly Intro.
No. 5836, 1966 N.Y. Legis. Record & Index 1020. See Cohen at 13.
23. See Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 1, col. 4.
24. "The proponents of the proposal chose to compromise and took the two conver-
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Although New York's lack of a permanent record of legislative debate com-
plicates legislative history analysis, some conclusions may be drawn. Senator
John H. Hughes2 5 believed that the new law would not be applied retroactively;
on the other hand, Phillip Schafeffer, counsel to the committee which produced
the Wilson-Sutton bill, asserted that the committee intended full retroactiv-
ity.26 However, the lapse of time between the various proposals makes these
conflicting opinions reconcilable and indicates that Senator Hughes' opinion
should be afforded greater weight, even though to some extent it was based
on the questionable belief that retroactive application would be unconstitu-
tional.27 This opinion was based largely on the assumption that retroactive
application was expressly barred because the two year living apart minimum
could not be computed to include any period prior to September 1, 1966.28
However, this provision as interpreted relates only to the beginning of the
two year computation, and does not bar conversion of prior decrees after
expiration of the requisite period, i.e., on September 1, 1968.29 On the other
hand, the law's five year statute of limitations is specifically inapplicable to
conversion divorces-indicating an intent to allow conversion of the numerous
separation decrees granted more than five years prior to the crucial date.8"
In 1968, the legislature amended section 170(5) in minor respects,9 1 con-
currently amending section 170(6) to require that separation agreements be
subscribed and acknowledged by the parties on or after August 1, 1966 to
qualify for conversion. 32 The Legislative Memorandum accompanying the bill
stated that the amendment expressed an intent to bar retroactive effect for
section 170(6).33 As to section 170(5), it said:
As originally introduced this bill would also have provided that the separation
ground for divorce based upon a judgment or decree of separation must have been
sion grounds . . . explaining, rather lamely, I suggest, that otherwise divorce reform
might have to wait another 149 years." Perles pt. 2, at 4, col. 3 (citation omitted).
25. Senator Hughes was Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, a sponsor of the lead-
ers' bill, and a chief architect of the compromise measure finally enacted.
26. Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4, col. 1.
27. Id.
28. Law of April 27, 1966, ch. 254, § 15, [19661 N.Y. Laws 842.
29. See Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4, col. 1 & n.8.
30. Law of April 27, 1966, ch. 254, art. 11-A, § 210(b)(c), [1966) N.Y. Laws 836.
31. Law of June 16, 1968, ch. 700, § 1, [19681 N.Y. Laws 2314. Since some states
grant separation judgments rather than decrees, the statutory language was changed to
include the former. In addition, the amendment lessened the requirement of compliance
with judgment or decree from "due" to "substantial" compliance.
32. Id. § 2. This date was later changed to April 27, 1966 to allow conversion of sep-
aration agreements filed after that date in reliance on the original statute. Law of May
26, 1969, ch. 964, § 1, [1969] N.Y. Laws 2351. Thus, conversion of old separation agree-
ments was effectively precluded unless both parties decided to re-execute. The failure to
similarly modify section 170(5) was thought to raise a "negative inference" that the sec-
tion could be applied retroactively. See Foster & Freed, Family Law, 20 Syracuse L. Rev.
411, 412-13 (1968).
33. joint Legis. Comm. on Matrimonial & Family Laws, Memorandum on Proposed
Amendments to N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170, [19681 McKinney's N.Y. Laws 2308.
[Vol. 3 8
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one granted on or after September 1, 1966. By amendment, this limitation was deleted.
The bill as it now stands, demonstrates a legislative intent to construe that provision
as retroactive.34
Significantly, the Governor was advised of this intent before signing the act,
and was informed by his counsel that only section 170(6) would be denied
retroactive application.35
Thus, although the statutory language clearly supports retroactive applica-
tion, the 1966 Legislature, as a whole, apparently understood the section to
be only prospective in application. 6 While the 1968 Legislature apparently
intended retroactive application, its action merely added to the existing state
of confusion; judicial conflict in interpretation was almost inevitable. This
conflict culminated in diametrically opposed decisions in two departments of
the appellate division,37 and was resolved only by a decision of the New York
Court of Appeals construing section 170(5) as retroactive 3a-a decision which
raises important constitutional3 and public policy questions.
I. CONFLICT IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. Trial Court Decisions
Generally, those lower courts which found section 170(5) to be retroactive
relied on the statutory language and the avowed intent set forth in the 1968
Legislative Memorandum; 0 those courts adopting the opposite view relied on
the 1966 Legislature's silence as to retroactivity to infer that it was not in-
tended. 41 Although most trial courts held section 170(5) to be retroactive,42
opposition to this view was extensive.
In Abelson v. Abelson,43 the court indicated that the legislature's failure to
include express language of retroactivity barred such an interpretation." How-
34. Id. For a discussion of retroactivity which distinguishes between "method retroac-
tivity" and "vested rights retroactivity," see Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Con-
siderations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 216, 216-20 (1960). See generally
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
35. Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4, col. 2.
36. Id. pt. 2, at.4, col. 2.
37. Schacht v. Schacht, 32 App. Div. 2d 201, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1969);
Gleason v. Gleason, 32 App. Div. 2d 402, 302 N.YS.2d 857 (1st Dep't 1969), rev'd, 26
N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E2d 513, 308 N.YS.2d 347 (1970).
38. Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E2d 513, 30S N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
39. Counsel for the respondent in Gleason has indicated that an application for a writ
of certiorari may eventually be filed to determine these constitutional issues. See N.Y.L.J,
Jan. 22, 1970, at 1, coL 7.
40. See Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4, coL 2 & n.8. See also Leclaire v. Leclaire, 58
Misc. 2d 41, 294 N.YS.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
41. Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4, col. 1 & n.8.
42. Id. pt. 1, at 4, col. 3 n.8.
43. 59 Misc. 2d 172, 298 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. CL 1969).
44. Id. at 178-79, 298 N.YS.2d at 387-88 (dictum). See also 1 McKinney's Cons. Laws
of N.Y, Statutes § 74 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Statutes] as to implications to be
drawn from legislative silence.
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ever, since statutory provisions generally are construed with any subsequent
amendments, 45 the intent of the 1968 Legislature could support retroactive
application. The 1968 amendment and its accompanying Legislative Memoran-
dum provided the basis for the decision in Adelman v. Adelman.40 There, the
court found the legislative intent easily determinable and held section 170(5)
to be retroactive. 47 The Abelson court had rejected this approach because the
1968 Legislature did not specifically treat the question of retroactivity, and
it declined to infer any intent from the Legislative Memorandum which was
not manifest in the amendment itself.48
In Zientara v. Zientara,49 the trial court found that the 1968 amendment
was not a reenactment of the entire section; 50 therefore, the law "remained the
creature of [the 1966] body." 51 The court also concluded that sound legislative
policy required that both conversion grounds be treated identically as to retro-
activity. Since section 170(6) is expressly non-retroactive, the court felt that
section 170(5) also should be prospective only. 52 However, this interpretation
disregards the significant differences involved. For example, while a separation
agreement is a voluntary undertaking largely governed by the law of contracts,
a separation decree is a final judicial determination; the rights and remedies
concerning enforcement or modification are substantially different. 3 Further,
the Zientara court seemingly gave insufficient consideration to the possibility
of fraud and collusion inherent in the conversion of separation agreements-
a possibility practically non-existent with separation decrees, which are matters
of court record.5 4
45. See Statutes § 97.
46. 58 Misc. 2d 803, 296 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
47. Id. at 804, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
48. 59 Misc. 2d at 178, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88.
49. 59 Misc. 2d 344, 299 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 32 App. Div. 2d 822, 302
N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1969).
So. Id. at 351, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 260. If the amendment were a reenactment of the en-
tire section, the intent of the 1966 Legislature would have been superseded by that of
the 1968 body. See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 31 App. Div. 2d 247, 249-50, 297 N.Y.S.2d 881,
884 (2d Dep't 1969).
51. 59 Misc. 2d at 351, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
52. Id. at 352, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 261. This proposition was cited with approval in
Gleason v. Gleason, 32 App. Div. 2d 402, 406, 302 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861 (1st Dep't 1969),
rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970). In Shapiro v. Shapiro,
59 Misc. 2d 412, 298 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1969), the legislative failure expressly to
deny retroactivity in the 1968 amendment to section 170(5) was interpreted as an intent
to allow retroactive application only by the innocent spouse. Id. at 418-19, 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 791. The assumption made by the court was that such a provision, if added, would
have precluded all retroactive conversion. See notes 67-75 infra and accompanying text.
53. See 58 Misc. 2d at 809, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 where the court noted the differences
in enforcement procedures. For an excellent survey of the distinctions between separation
agreements and decrees, see M. Grossman, New York Law of Domestic Relations §§ 398-
496 (1942) and the 1962 Cumulative Supplements thereto. See also Foster & Freed pt. 3,
at 1, col. 5. But see Statutes § 74.
54. Foster & Freed pt. 3, at 1, col. 5 and at 4, col. 1.
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Church v. Church55 also held section 170(5) to be solely prospective, claim-
ing retroactive application against innocent spouses would violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the New York 0 and federalr t consti-
tutions by impairing vested property rights.5s On the other hand, the Adelman
court found this argument nugatory, since an expectation based upon the con-
tinuation of present law could not be "vested."' O It further noted that unvested
statutory privileges and exemptions such as are involved in the marriage rela-
tion may be abrogated by the state.G0 On the other hand, even in denying
retroactive application, the Abelson court likewise noted the legislature's power
to deprive a wife of her statutory right to inherit, although it found serious
constitutional objections to retroactive application.0 '
The well-reasoned trial court opinion in Gleason v. Gleasonv- noted the many
conflicting interpretations. The court commented:
The deep, moral, ethical and religious issues which confronted the Legislature in
the enactment of the new divorce law are now again being aired with respect to the
manner in which the new law is to be applied in the courts. It is therefore no surprise
that the decisions, to date, on this issue have been far from uniform.03
In analyzing the objections to retroactive application, the court found the con-
stitutional issues to be most serious. 64 After pointing out that there are no
vested rights to remain married or to inherit,65 the court noted that those states
which have construed non-fault divorce grounds retroactively had faced and
rejected the same constitutional arguments. Thus, the Gleason court was unable
to find any showing of unconstitutionality. 0
B. Variations on the Theme: The Imposition of Fault Criteria
The interpretive conflict in the trial courts was not limited solely to the
question of retroactivity. In some cases, retroactive application was qualified
by a distinction as to the status of the plaintiff. For example, Shapiro v.
Shapiro7 held that section 170(5) could be applied retroactively in favor of
55. 58 ,Misc. 2d 753, 296 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
56. N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11.
57. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. 58 Misc. 2d at 754-55, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The vested rights which the court
thought would be impaired were the marital status, property, social security and inher-
itance rights. Id. at 754, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
59. 58 Misc. 2d at 806-08, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05.
60. Id. at 807, 296 N.YS.2d at 1004-05.
61. 59 fisc. 2d at 181, 298 N.YS.2d at 390.
62. 59 Misc. 2d 96, 298 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 32 App. Div. 2d 402, 302
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1st Dep't 1969), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.YS.2d 347
(1970).
63. Id. at 98-99, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
64. Id. at 99, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 378. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; id. amend. XWV, § 1;
N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11.
65. 59 MIsc. 2d at 99, 298 N.YS.2d at 379.
66. Id. at 100-01, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 379-80.
67. 59 Misc. 2d 412, 298 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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the innocent but not the guilty spouse.08 In reaching this decision, the court
found section 170(5) to be entirely fault oriented, 0 as only the innocent
spouse initially could obtain a separation decree which later would be conver-
tible into a divorce.70 The court indicated that the legislature had been mindful
of the economic benefits7l which a spouse might lose through an undesired
conversion, and had demonstrated a "sympathetic recognition of these prac-
tical considerations." 72 The court also noted that rules of statutory construction
sanctioned this result, and presumed that the legislature was aware of these
rules.73 By giving the innocent spouse the election to proceed under section
170(5) or to pursue her remedy in Family Court,74 the legislature allowed her
the option of precluding a New York divorce.75
68. Id. at 415, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 788. The court used these terms to distinguish a suc-
cessful plaintiff in a prior separation action (innocent) from the defendant therein (guilty).
However, as noted in Schacht v. Schacht, 32 App. Div. 2d 201, 203-04, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151,
154 (2d Dep't 1969), the term "guilty" frequently is inaccurate. In separation actions
ostensibly based on fault but actually grounded on incompatibility, the plaintiff may
have been equally or even more responsible for the collapse of the marriage than the de-
fendant.
69. 59 Misc. 2d at 415, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89. See also Church v. Church, 58 Misc. 2d
753, 755, 296 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1968), dismissing the complaint In an uncon-
tested divorce action on the ground that it could not be maintained by the guilty spouse.
70. New York presently allows separation on the following grounds: (1) cruel and In-
human treatment which renders cohabitation unsafe or improper; (2) abandonment; (3)
a husband's neglect or refusal to provide for his wife; (4) adultery; and (5) confinement
to prison after marriage for three or more consecutive years. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 200
(Supp. 1969).
71. 59 Misc. 2d at 416, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 789. The most obvious and important economic
benefit which might be lost through conversion is the surviving spouse's statutory right
of election against the decedent's will. See N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-1.1 (1967), as amended, Id.
(Supp. 1969). See also id. § 5-1.4 (1967), as amended, id. (Supp. 1969) on the effect of
such a divorce upon the decedent spouse's will. Concern has also been voiced over the
possible loss of survivor's rights under social security and pension plans. See note 58 supra.
72. 59 Misc. 2d at 416, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
73. Id. at 419-20, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 792. For example, the court pointed out the general
rule that statutes are given prospective application. While remedial statutes are an excep-
tion to this rule, only procedural statutes are considered remedial. Since the innocent spouse
was able to institute a separation action under prior law, the Divorce Reform Law pro.
vided a further remedy and in that sense was remedial and hence retroactive. On the other
hand, since the guilty spouse was not entitled to a separation under prior law, as to him
section 170(5) was a new remedy and not a mere change in procedure. Thus It should be
applied only prospectively. Id.
74. Under the Family Court Act, a husband, if possessed of sufficient means, is charge-
able with the support of his wife, N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 412 (1963), and a father with
the support of his minor children, id. § 413 (Supp. 1969), and may be required to pay
a reasonable sum as determined by the court.
75. 59 Misc. 2d at 416, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90. Even in limiting retroactive applica-
tion to the innocent spouse, the court noted, "it is clear that religious considerations, a
spouse's inchoate inheritance rights, and other related economic benefits such as those un-
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An analogous attempt to impose unlegislated restrictions on conversion di-
vorces is found in Abelson v. Abelson. There the defendant wife attempted
to raise the equitable clean hands doctrine by pleading as a defense the
plaintiff husband's conduct since the entry of the separation decree."8 In refus-
ing to dismiss the defense, the court found the issue proper for factual deter-
mination. It noted that although the power over matrimonial actions is derived
solely from statute 79 historically they have been equitable in nature and the
clean hands doctrine has been applied.80
In view of the legislature's failure to provide the traditional divorce defenses
der social security, pension and group health plans, are neither 'vested rights' . . . nor
otherwise constitutionally protected .... " Id. at 416, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (citations omit-
ted). In Adelman v. Adelman, 58 Misc. 2d 803, 296 N.Y-.2d 999 (Sup. CL 1969), the
Shapiro rationale was specifically rejected. Although decided prior to Shapiro, Adelman
considered the innocent spouse argument. Noting the absence of any express limitation, the
court held that "[t]he question of fault is not involved." Id. at 805, 296 N.YS.2d at 1003.
76. 59 Misc. 2d 172, 298 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
77. Under the clean hands doctrine, a court of equity will refuse relief to suitors who
are themselves guilty of unconscionable conduct in the transaction in question. See 2 J.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 379-99, 90-100 (Sth ed. 1941).
78. Defendant alleged that plaintiff had been living in open adultery, as he had pro-
cured a void Mexican divorce; that he had married his paramour in Connecticut; and that
defendant had obtained a declaratory judgment that the Mexican divorce was void. 59
Misc. 2d at 173, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
79. 59 Misc. 2d at 175, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 385. See note 1 supra.
80. 59 Misc. 2d at 175, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 385, citing Lodati v. Lodati, 268 App. Div.
1003, 52 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1944) (unclean hands found in an annulment action where
plaintiff husband had financed his wife's prior divorce and, for reasons relating to the
Selective Service Act, had knowingly induced her to marry him before her decree became
final); Gevis v. Gevis, 141 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (agreement to pay plaintiff
alimony until she remarried not reinstatable where plaintiff had remarried but the mar-
riage had been dissolved due to plaintiff's fraudulent representations of willingness to bear
children); Holiber v. Holiber, 207 Misc. 716, 139 N.YS.2d 774 (Sup. CL 1955) (wife seek-
ing modification of divorce decree to provide increased alimony and support payments had
unclean hands, in that she concealed her remarriage from the court). Accord, Church v.
Church, 58 Misc. 2d 753, 296 N.YS.2d 716 (Sup. CL 1968), where the court stated:
"While the rights with respect to the marital status adjudicated in a matrimonial action
are statutory in origin, the court which adjudicates them sits in equity, and a prior
'guilty' spouse does not come to that court with clean hands. To reward the 'guilty' spouse
against the prior and present innocent spouse offends and violates fundamental concepts
of fairness, due process and equal protection of the laws. It not only ignores, but it di-
vests and impairs, the innocent spouse's vested rights of marital status, property, social
security and inheritance." Id. at 755, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 718. But see Foster & Freed, who
state: "Divorce cases are not proceedings in equity nor does the plaintiff seek an extraor-
dinary equitable remedy. The proceedings are statutory, and the plaintiff seeks statutory
relief. The Legislature in effect has said that certain dead marriages should be subject to
legal termination regardless of fault; hence, a gratuitous imposition of the clean hands
doctrine is in derogation of the Divorce Reform Law and an emasculation of section
170(5)." Id. pt. 2, at 4, cols. 1-2.
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such as recrimination, 8' collusion,82 connivance, 83 or condonation 84 in conver-
sion divorce actions, 8 5 such a position is questionable. It would appear that
the clean hands doctrine survives only to the limited extent of the statutory
requirement that the plaintiff substantially perform the terms of the underlying
separation decree to receive a conversion divorce. 80 Furthermore, since the re-
quirement of "substantial performance" was substituted in 1968 for the prior
requirement of "due performance," 87 there is an indication of a legislative
intent to deny conversion divorce only to those guilty of serious misconduct.
C. Conflict in the Appellate Division
The conflict apparent in the lower courts soon reached the appellate division,
where a direct split of authority developed. In Schacht v. Schacht,88 the second
department unanimously held section 170(5) to be retroactive. However, in
Gleason v. Gleason,8 9 a divided first department, with two justices concurring
in a separate opinion and two justices dissenting, held it to be solely prospec-
tive. The comprehensive opinion of the Gleason trial court, cited with approval
by the second department in Schacht,9" carried little weight with the first de-
partment.
The Schacht court heavily relied on a literal reading of the statute to support
its finding of retroactivity, 9' and found this conclusion bolstered by the legis-
lative intent.9 2 On the other hand, the Gleason court found the available data
both "confusing and indecisive." 93 On this basis, the court declined to speculate
on the reason for the 1968 Legislature's failure to act on the proposed limita-
81. The recrimination defense is similar to the clean hands doctrine. It permits either
party to preclude divorce by establishing the other party's commission of an offense which
would constitute a statutory ground for divorce. See F. Keezer, Marriage and Divorce
§ 522, at 563-66 (3d ed. 3. Morland 1946); Wadlington at 38.
82. The collusion defense is designed to prevent parties from actively cooperating to
obtain a divorce. F. Keezer, supra note 81, § 515, at 546-50; Wadlington at 39.
83. When one spouse consents to conduct of the other which otherwise would be
grounds for divorce under circumstances where consent is considered corrupt, the consent-
ing spouse is barred from obtaining a divorce. F. Keezer, supra note 81, § 516, at 550-52;
Wadlington at 39.
84. An innocent spouse who forgives an offending spouse relinquishes the right of ac-
tion for divorce, subject to revival under certain circumstances. F. Keezer, supra note 81,
§ 519, at 553-58; Wadlington at 39.
85. See Foster & Freed pt. 2, at 4, cols. 1-2. Cf. Perles pt. 2, at 4, col. 2.
86. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(5) (Supp. 1969). In view of plaintiff's failure to make
timely support payments, it would seem that the resort to the clean hands doctrine In
Abelson was not absolutely necessary. See 59 Misc. 2d at 173, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
87. Law of June 16, 1968, ch. 700, [1968) N.Y. Laws 1473.
88. 32 App. Div. 2d 201, 301 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1969).
89. 32 App. Div. 2d 402, 302 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1st Dep't 1969), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256
N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
90. 32 App. Div. 2d at 204, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
91. Id. at 202, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
92. Id. at 203, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
93. 32 App. Div. 2d at 404, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
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tion to section 170(5). 94 It found the intent of the 1966 Legislature controlling,
requiring prospective application.95
The Gleason opinion was confined to determinations of legislative intent,
public policy,90 and rules of statutory construction, 7 only once referring to
possible constitutional violations. In this regard, the court expressed doubt
whether the state constitutionally could sanction the dissolution of marriages
without the consent of the innocent spouse. 8 In contrast, the concurring opin-
ion was based almost exclusively on constitutional arguments-primarily the
possibility of a violation of the equal protection clause if retroactive application
were granted.99
IV. RESOLUTION oF THE QuEsTION: Gleason iN THE CourT op APPEAs
When this conflict reached the court of appeals, it said:
We agree with the dissenters in the First Department and the unanimous Appellate
Division for the Second Department that the Legislature intended that subdivision (5)
of section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law should be applied "retroactively," in the
sense of encompassing pre-1966 decrees, and that, as so applied, it offends against
neither due process, the equal protection of the law nor any other constitutional
provision.' 00
Initially, the court of appeals dealt with the problems raised in Shapiro and
Abelson. The court emphasized that the plaintiff husband's status as the prior
guilty spouse was irrelevant,10 1 as the legislative policy in conversion divorce
merely requires separation without reconciliation for the two year period as
an indication that the parties are irreconcilable. 10 2 Within this scheme, "[t]he
function of the decree . . . is merely to authenticate the fact of separation."'103
In accepting retroactive application, the court gave heavy emphasis to
the legislative history of the Divorce Reform Law and the policy behind it,1' 4
94. Id. at 404-05, 302 N.Y.S2d at 860.
95. Id. at 405, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
96. The court felt that sound policy requires both conversion grounds to be treated
alike. Id. at 405-06, 302 N.YS.2d at 861.
97. The court found that a statute should not be applied retroactively if it can be sat-
isfied entirely by prospective application, citing Statutes § 51, and that a statute should
not be given retroactive effect when capable of any other construction, citing Walker v.
Walker, 155 N.Y. 77, 81, 49 N.E. 663, 664 (1898). See 32 App. Div. 2d at 404, 302 N.YS.2d
at 860.
98. 32 App. Div. 2d at 407-08, 302 N.Y..2d at 863.
99. Id. at 409, 302 N.YS.2d at 865 (concurring opinion). For an indication of the dis-
favor with which the Supreme Court regards constitutional claims against retroactive leg-
islation, see Slawson, supra note 34, at 235-44.
100. Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 256 N.E.2d 513, 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347,
350 (1970).
101. Id. at 35, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 37, 256 N.E.2d at 517-18, 308, N.YS.2d at 353.
104. See id. at 36-40, 256 N.E.2d at 517-19, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 3M2-55.
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and found an unequivocal legislative purpose in favor of retroactivity. 10 It
noted that although the law was to become effective on September 1, 1967, It
specifically declared that the two year periods required under sections 170(5)
and 170(6) "'shall not be computed to include any period prior to September
first, nineteen hundred sixty-six,' a year before the statute's effective date ...
If the Legislature had intended that the decree must be one granted .. sub-
sequent to the effective date of the statute . . . it could not logically have
prescribed that the period of living apart might begin one year prior to that
effective date."'-0 6 Moreover, the court found that the 1968 amendment was a
reenactment of the law, making the intent of the 1968 Legislature controlling
and resolving any possible doubt about the intent of the 1966 Legislature.'"°
Interpretation was expedited by an examination of the real purpose of the
section, which the court found was "to sanction divorce on grounds unrelated
to misconduct. . . .Implicit in the statutory scheme is the legislative recog-
nition that it is socially and morally undesirable to compel couples to a dead
marriage to retain an illusory and deceptive status and that the best interests
not only of the parties but of society itself will be furthered by enabling them
'to extricate themselves from a perpetual state of marital limbo' ... .*"10 In
view of the moral and social undesirability of maintaining the legal fiction of
a marriage which for all practical purposes has terminated, the court felt that
denying retroactive application would in effect thwart the legislative purpose
behind providing non-fault grounds for divorce.1 09
V. Is Gleason CONSTiTuTiONAL?
A. The Arguments Advanced
Many of the earlier New York decisions denying retroactivity were at least
partially predicated on constitutional considerations."10 It was feared that
105. Id. at 39, 256 N.E.2d at 518, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 354. Prior to the court of appeals
decision, many writers took the position that the legislative purpose was highly obscure.
Following a comprehensive analysis of the problems involved, two noted authors stated:
"Our conclusions regarding the statutory intent as to retroactivity may be summarized as
follows: (1) On April 27, 1966, the legislature understood or 'thought' sections 170(5)
and (6) were not retroactive; (2) the statutory language supports retroactivity; (3) by
a strict construction and an emphasis upon legislative silence as to the precise point, an
argument may be made against retroactivity; and (4) to hold that an 'innocent' but not
a 'guilty' party may qualify for divorce under section 170(5) is judicial legislation in to-
tal disregard of legislative intent, as is the imposition of the clean hands doctrine in such
cases." Foster & Freed pt. 2, at 4, col. 2.
106. 26 N.Y.2d at 36-37, 256 NE.2d at 517, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 352 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 39 n.9, 256 N.E.2d at 518 n.9, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 354 n.9.
108. Id. at 35, 256 N.E.2d at 516, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
109. Id. at 39, 256 N.E.2d at 518-19, 308 N.Y..2d at 354-55.
110. See, e.g., Gleason v. Gleason, 32 App. Div. 2d 402, 409, 302 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1st
Dep't 1969) (concurring opinion), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d
347 (1970); Zientara v. Zientara, 59 Misc. 2d 344, 345, 299 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (Sup. Ct.)Q,
rev'd, 32 App. Div. 2d 822, 302 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1969); Abelson v. Abelson, 59 Misc. 2d
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retroactive application would violate the due process,"' equal protection l- and
impairment of contracts1 3 clauses of the constitution by depriving innocent
spouses of vested property rights.11 4 The court of appeals found these argu-
ments invalid, a view seemingly amply supported by precedent.
Traditionally, federal concern with state regulation of marriages has been
negligible,- 5 as this power was thought to have been reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment. 1 6 Similarly, the marital status was not thought to be a
contract within the impairment of contracts clause of the constitution." 7 Al-
though the traditional federal reluctance to impose constitutional standards
on state regulation of marital affairs recently has been questioned, there has
been little indication of any inclination to supervise state requirements for
divorce. A noted authority has stated:
[R]ecent decisions of the Supreme Court may support [the] thesis that traditional
state control of the marital status has to give way to current notions of individual
liberty and the right of privacy. In Griswold v. Couttcticut,118 "an uncommonly silly
law" 119 forbidding the dissemination of birth control information, for which justifica-
tion was claimed due to the state's concern over extra-marital relations, was held to
violate the penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights as read into the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Loving v. Virginia,-20 miscegenation statutes were declared unconsti-
tutional per se and marriage was characterized as a "basic civil right of man."12 1
Together, these two decisions raise a challenge to state regulation of marriage and
the freedom to remarry after divorce. No longer may it be assumed that the states
172, 177, 298 N.YS2d 381, 384 (Sup. CL 1969); Church v. Church, 58 Misc. 2d 753, 755,
296 N.YS.2d 716, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
111. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
112. Id.
113. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
114. The prohibition against ex post facto laws has also been suggested as a reason for
denying retroactive application. However, it is generally recognized that the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws pertains only to criminal statutes. See, eg., Gershen-
son, The Divorce Reform Law: A Brief for Retroactivity (pts. 1-3), 158 N.Y.LJ., July
24-26, 1967, pt. 2, at 1, col. 4.
115. See Foster & Freed, Family Law, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 411 (1968). See generally
Foster, Recognition of Migratory Divorces: Rosentiel v. Section 250, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 429,
446-49 (1968) for a recent discussion of federal full faith and credit problems.
116. See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 32-33 (1903) (constitution does not confer
federal power to regulate marriage; it resides in the states). See also Wadlington at 35-36.
117. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 US. 190, 210-11 (1888). In explaining why he did not
treat the impairment of contracts argument separately from those of due process and equal
protection, one author stated: "No Supreme Court decision in the last 25 years dealing with
contracts has been found that did not contain language to the effect that what was said
about the contract clause was equally applicable to the claimant's charge that he was being
deprived of property without due process of law." Slawson, supra note 34, at 221 (footnote
omitted).
118. 381 US. 479 (1965).
119. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
120. 388 US. 1 (1967).
121. Id. at 12.
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have autonomy over rules and laws governing marital status, for if marriage is a
civil right, it is constitutionally protected. 122
While this reasoning indicates a possible basis for federal constitutional chal-
lenge of state regulation, there is no indication that such a trend would be
applied against the elimination of statutorily created rights. Further, it has
been noted that retroactive application eliminates one potentially serious con-
stitutional objection-perpetuating the obligation of support and precluding the
husband's remarriage, while judicially absolving his spouse from the perfor-
mance of wifely duties.123
The court of appeals' thorough treatment of the constitutional objections
raised by retroactive application leaves little doubt of their lack of merit.124
The court pointed out that a vested right is an "immediate, fixed right of
present or future enjoyment,"1 25 while marital rights are contingent and may
be altered or abolished by the legislature prior to vesting.120 The wife's right
of inheritance is similar to the right of dower in that it is a mere expectancy
and does not vest until the death of her husband. 27 In short, the State, having
the power directly to limit or abolish rights of succession to the property of a
living person, may undoubtedly do so indirectly by providing a new ground
for divorce."'128
Likewise, there appears to be no denial of equal protection in permitting
retroactive application of section 170(5) while limiting section 170(6) to
prospective application. 29 To violate the equal protection clause, a classifica-
122. Foster at 51 (author's footnotes renumbered) (emphasis added). It should be
noted that both of the cases cited involved rather extreme statutory abuses of rights which
were considered "basic." Similar reasoning could produce an argument that an Individual
has a basic right to divorce in order to remarry in furtherance of his pursuit of marital
happiness. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 261 (1945) (dissenting opinion). On the other hand, the strongest argument
against retroactivity involves the loss of the wife's right to share in her husband's estate.
See N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-1.1 (1967), as amended, id. (Supp. 1969). Far from being "basic,"
this right, while an extension of the common law right of dower, is entirely statutory. See
Foster & Freed, Family Law, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 411 (1968), suggesting "the possibility
of successful constitutional challenge of statutory relics founded on dogma rather than
some demonstrable public good." Id.
123. Foster & Freed pt. 3, at 4, cols. 1-2.
124. See 26 N.Y.2d at 40-42, 256 N.E.2d at 519-21, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56.
125. Id. at 40, 256 N.E.2d at 519, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56 (citation omitted).
126. Id. See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal.
App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10
N.E.2d 619 (1937); Bunten v. Bunten, 15 N.J. 532, 192 A. 727 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Hanfgarn v.
Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937); Adelman v. Add-
man, 58 Misc. 2d 803, 296 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
127. 26 N.Y.2d at 40, 256 N.E.2d at 519, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
128. Id. at 41, 256 N.E.2d at 520, 308 N.YS.2d at 356.
129. Cf. note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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tion must be palpably arbitrary.1 30 However, the differences between separation
decrees and agreements are sufficient to withstand constitutional challenge.1 31
B. Comparison With Other States
The experience of other states which have enacted non-fault grounds for
divorce indicates that retroactive application is constitutional. "[T]he fact
remains that a near consensus of state and federal cases have applied new
divorce grounds retroactively"' 32 without finding constitutional violations. 33
Moreover, some states denying retroactive application have done so on the
basis of provisions peculiar to their individual state constitutions. 3 4 With
reference to these provisions, the New York Court of Appeals as early as 1878
was prompted to observe:
It is a subject on which much has been said by courts in different States, and not
with entire accord; and in several cases in different States it has been held, as we
gather from decisions, that a law authorizing a judgment of divorce on account of
acts done before its passage, is not in conflict with a constitutional provision against
retroactive or retrospective laws.' 35
Further, it should be noted that most statutes providing new divorce grounds
are silent on the issue of retroactivity, as was the Divorce Reform Law, yet
retroactive application is the prevailing rule. 30
130. See Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 US. 376 (1960);
9 N.Y. Jur. Constitutional Law § 295 (1960). See also Foster & Freed pt. 3, at 4, col. 1.
131. E.g., imposition as opposed to voluntary agreement; intervention by state author-
ity; available enforcement procedures, etc. See 26 N.Y.2d at 41, 256 N.E.2d at 519, 303
N.Y.S.2d at 356; M. Grossman, New York Law of Domestic Relations §§ 398-496 (1947)
and 1962 Cumulative Supplements thereto.
As one author points out, often arguments phrased in terms of constitutional issues in
reality are based upon a reliance interest. See Slawson, supra note 34, at 225-26. Thus it
is possible that individuals have relied upon a particular law in planning their actions and
that a change in the law often will result in frustration of their purposes. However, the
author notes that change required by the common good precludes any possibility of ever
achieving absolute reliance, and concludes that "[rleliance on existing rules, therefore, must
be sacrificed to some extent to the need for change." Id. at 226.
132. Foster & Freed pt. 2, at 1, col. 1.
133. See Annot., 23 A.L.R3d 626 (1969); Foster & Freed pt. 1, at 4 n.4; Gershenson,
supra note 114, pt. 3, at 1, col S. For a list of cases holding that new divorce legislation
may be applied retroactively (the majority view), and those holding the opposite, see An-
not., 23 A.L.R.3d 626, 630-32 (1969).
134. E.g., N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. XXIII (1792), denounces retrospective laws and pro-
hibits their passage "either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses."
Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380 (1839), held that this prohibition invalidated a statute pur-
porting to make desertion which took place before the statute's enactment a ground for
divorce.
135. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 233 (1878), appeal dismissed, 131 U.S. appendix clxv
(1879).
136. Wadlington at 80. However, retroactive application sometimes has been expressly
specified. Id.
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The Gleason court noted that this "overwhelming weight of authority" sup-
porting retroactive application1 37 had arisen in spite of constitutional challenges
in each state,138 citing cases from jurisdictions retroactively applying new
living apart grounds for divorce.' 39 In Stallings v. Stallings,140 a statute141
permitting divorce after living apart pursuant to a separation decree was silent
on the question of retroactivity. The court concluded that the statute was di-
rected at the continuing act of separation, and was satisfied upon the expiration
of the specified time period.Y42 It observed that the legislature's power to regu-
late divorce was conferred by statute, and held that "no right of either party is
divested by limiting or extending the time for applying to have the decree of
separation made absolute as a divorce."' 43 Similarly, in Hagen v. Hagen,'44
the absence of an express requirement of retroactivity in a living apart divorce
statute was found to be irrelevant.1 45 Further, retroactive application was
found not to be unconstitutional "as being retroactive legislation."' 40 In the
face of this and other precedent, 47 the Gleason court correctly concluded that
retroactive application is not unconstitutional. 48
The most recent state to enact non-fault grounds for divorce is California,
which has just completed the first major revision of its divorce law since its
enactment in 1872.149 The California reform was designed to lessen the in-
evitable emotional pain and eliminate the "sideshow elements" which attend
so many divorce cases.Y50 Under the new law, incurable insanity and irrecon-
cilable differences are now the sole grounds for marital dissolution,15' and the
trial judge determines whether the differences are sufficient to warrant relief."' '
Although alimony will still be granted, the amount will be determined after
consideration of the duration of the marriage and the earning ability of the
woman.15' Although this reform undoubtedly was prompted by policy con-
137. 26 N.Y.2d at 36 n.5, 256 N.E.2d at 317 n.5, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 352 n.5.
138. Id. at 42, 256 N.E.2d at 521, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
139. Id.
140. 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687 (1933).
141. Law of July 7, 1932, Act No. 56, § 1, [1932) La. Acts 265 (now La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9:302 (1965)).
142. 177 La. at 495, 148 So. at 689.
143. Id.
144. 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965).
145. Id. at 796, 139 S.E.2d at 824.
146. Id. at 796, 139 S.E.2d at 825.
147. Cf. Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938); Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196
Minn. 599, 265 N.W. 811 (1936); Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965).
See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 626 (1969).
148. 26 N.Y.2d at 43, 256 N.E.2d at 521, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
149. See N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1969. at 1, col. 6.
150. Id., quoting Governor Ronald Reagan.
151. Cal. Civ. Code § 4506 (West Supp. 1970).
152. Id. § 4508.
153. Id. § 4801(a).
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siderations similar to those which led to New York's Divorce Reform Law,
California seems to have achieved its goal with far less compromise.
VI. CONCLUSION
In interpreting New York's new public policy as enacted in the Divorce
Reform Law, the court of appeals observed:
An insistence upon a fault-oriented ground of divorce, where the marriage, under
the Legislature's present policy, ought to be dissolved, would for years perpetuate
two of the chief evils the new divorce law was designed to eliminate-collusive or
fraud-ridden divorce actions in this State and the continued pursuit of out-of-state
divorces based upon spurious residence and baseless claims. If, therefore, the legis-
lative aims and purposes are to be achieved, the statute must be interpreted as making
divorce available on living apart grounds pursuant to pre-1966 decrees just as it would
be if the decree were obtained later and regardless of the "guilt" or "innocence" of
the party seeking it.'5 4
Noticeably absent from this policy is a relief provision for spouses living
apart under pre-1966 separation agreements, who are precluded from divorce
by the refusal of the other party to re-execute the agreement. 5 Although re-
sort to fraud or collusion is perhaps impossible in such circumstances, the
migratory divorce problem'0 6 is still present to frustrate New York's new
public policy. The distinction between separation decrees and agreements made
in Gleason, although adequate to withstand constitutional challenge,'"7 fails
to justify the discriminatory application of public policy against those living
apart pursuant to pre-1966 separation agreements.
In Gleason, New York has repudiated the "basic inhumanity, if not inanity,
of protecting and preserving the legal bond when all other ties have been
broken."'o 8 The court of appeals not only implemented, but seemingly ex-
panded the new policy promulgated by the legislature, rejecting the state's
prior policy, which was "based on the medieval trial by fire approach to marital
relations and the theory of marital offense with an unnecessarily respectful
154. 26 N.Y.2d at 39-40, 256 N.E.2d at 519, 308 N.YS.2d at 354-55.
155. Originally, it was thought that the requirement that separation agreements be sub-
scribed and acknowledged after the crucial 1966 date would preclude conversion of prior
agreements. However, by re-executing and acknowledging such agreements, the parties
clearly can qualify them. See N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170(6) (Supp. 1969); Foster & Freed
pt. 1, at 4, col. 2.
156. See note 8 supra.
157. See 26 N.Y.2d at 41, 256 N.E2d at 520, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
158. Perles pt. 2, at 1, col. 5. Such an approach is, of course, entirely contrary to the
progressive theory of non-fault divorce. Compare the following excerpt from Plutarch,
Lives of Illustrious Men, Amelius Paulus, quoted in Tenney, Divorce Without Fault: The
Next Step, 46 Neb. L. Rev. 24 (1967): "A Roman divorced from his wife, being highly
blamed by his friends, who demanded 'Was she not chaste? Was she not fair? Was she not
fruitful?' holding out his shoe asked them whether it was not new and well made. 'Yet,'
added he, 'none of you can tell where it pinches me?"
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obeisance to the 'clean hands' doctrine but without any compassion or under-
standing of the dynamics of marital breakdown as a phenomenon which may
occur without fault of either party."' 159 Denying relief to those who live apart
under pre-1966 separation agreements is a retrogressive re-affirmation of that
policy which should not be permitted. Full implementation of the judicially
interpreted new public policy clearly calls for an amendment to the Divorce
Reform Law permitting conversion of pre-1966 separation agreements. l c0 A
potential reason for precluding retroactive application, the possibility of pre-
dating agreements to allow immediate conversion, is no longer as forceful as
when the date requirement was set. The courts can be relied upon to assure that
there actually has been a two year continuous separation.
The proposed amendment would eliminate the possibility of conduct such as
occurred in Revson v. Revson.101 There the wife had defaulted in her husband's
section 170(5) divorce action. After the husband's remarriage and the appellate
division's decision in Gleason, she moved to vacate the judgment because at the
time of her default there had been no appellate determination on the issue of
retroactive application.0 2 The appellate division affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the wife was entitled to reopen the judgment. Justice Nunez, dissenting,
noted that the wife's default was not inadvertent, and that the parties had
reached agreement on financial matters-including participation in each other's
estates.163 Surely such conduct, seemingly motivated solely by spite, should not
receive the sanction of the state.
Allowing conversion of "old" separation agreements would, at worst, place
the parties in substantially the same position as their counterparts who live apart
pursuant to separation decrees. In many cases, separation agreements embody
determinations reached by the parties concerning their rights upon death.10 4
Incorporation of these provisions in the divorce decree would give the survivor
a benefit not available to her counterpart with a separation decree, for it clearly
is within the power of the state to deprive the latter of rights granted by stat-
ute.165 On the other hand, a divorce incorporating an underlying separation
agreement adds the power of judicial enforcement to the ordinary contractual
remedies. Moreover, even if the separation agreement is not incorporated into
the divorce decree, the agreement remains independently enforceable as a con-
tract' 0 0 Thus, allowing retroactive application of section 170(6) would not
159. Perles pt. 1, at 4, col. 3.
160. Such an amendment might simply repeal the requirement that qualifying separa-
tion agreements be subscribed and acknowledged "on or after April twenty-seventh, nine-
teen hundred sixty-six." N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170(6) (Supp. 1969).
161. 33 App. Div. 2d 738, 305 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 738, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
163. Id. at 738, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93 (dissenting opinion).
164. For two examples of typical agreements, see 1 A. Lindey, Separation Agreements
and Ante-Nuptial Contracts §§ 1, 2 (1967).
165. Compare note 128 supra and accompanying text.
166. In Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889), the court of appeals
found error in imposing on the husband a greater obligation than was required by the
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involve the potential financial inequities inherent in Gleason, except in the rare
case where the agreement does not contain a provision dealing with the survivor's
right to a share in the other's estate. Clearly, the new public policy enunciated
in Gleason requires retroactive application of section 170(6).
In Gleason, the court of appeals suggested that the legislature could grant the
courts discretion to award the wife an amount in lieu of her prospective inheri-
tance rights.'6 7 Clearly, some provision should be made permitting the courts
to deal with the equities of individual cases. Such a provision could provide an
opportunity to assure equitable financial security for wives separated under pre-
1966 separation agreements, in addition to those separated pursuant to decrees.
In each instance, the courts are in the best position to evaluate the merits of
the individual case and the compensation to which the spouse is entitled in order
to achieve an equitable dissolution. Clearly, they should be given this power.
As the court of appeals has noted, the underlying policy of the Divorce Re-
form Law is flaunted by the existence of deadlocked marriages whose dissolution
is precluded only by an arbitrary date requirement in the statute. Gleason has
done much to advance this underlying policy. The burden of moving forward
now rests with the legislature.
separation agreement. The court stated: "If . . . the parties have legal capacity to con-
tract, the subject of settlement is lawful and the contract without fraud or duress is prop-
erly and voluntarily executed, the court will not interfere. To hold otherwise would be
not only to establish a rule in violation of well-settled principles, but in, [sic] effect, it
would enable the court to disregard entirely settlements of this character. For, if the court
can decree that the husband must pay more than the parties have agreed upon, it is diffi-
cult to see any reason why it may not adjudge that the sum stipulated is in excess of the
wife's requirements and decree that the husband contribute a smaller amount." Id. at
646-47, 22 N.E. at 1117. In subsequent litigation between the same parties, the court stated
that the separation agreement would measure the support payments so long as it remained
unimpeached. Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N.Y. 272, 283, 33 N.E. 1062, 1064 (1893). Goldman
v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 33 N.E.2d 265 (1940) reaffirmed this position, subject to the
qualification that the sum agreed upon could not be "plainly insufficient." Id. at 301, 33
N.E.2d at 267.
"As was pointed out in the Goldman case, only a mutual act of the parties based upon
mutual intention, or some other cause recognized by law, could terminate [a] valid separa-
tion agreement. 'Such agreements, lawful when made, will be enforced like other agree-
ments unless impeached or challenged for some cause recognized by law. It is not in the
power of either party acting alone and against the will of the other to destroy or change
the agreement." Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N.Y. 21, 26, 38 NE.2d 114, 116 (1941)
(citation omitted).
167. 26 N.Y.2d at 43, 256 N.E.2d at 521, 308 N.YS.2d at 357-58.
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